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IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE."
ROBERT W. CALVERT*

One of the most frustrating experiences of a Texas: supreme court
justice is to be compelled to honor rules of procedure which lead in a
particular case to a result deemed by the court to be unjust. The
alternative, however, is to endow the court with unbridled discretion
to set aside or change lower court judgments at will. The alternative
would surely not be acceptable to lawyers, and it is doubtful that it
would even be welcomed by the court's justices.
There is only one area in appealed cases in which our supreme court
does have, and exercises, very broad discretion in the type of judgment
which it will render. The area is marked out by Rule 505, Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides:
In each case, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the judgment, or reverse and render such judgment as the Court of Civil
Appeals should have rendered, or reverse the judgment and remand the case to the lower court, if it shall appear that the justice
of the case demands another trial, subject to the provisions of
Rules 503 and 504 relating to reversals.
The first part of the rule directs the general course to be followed
by the supreme court when it reverses a judgment of a court of civil
appeals; it shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as the
court below [court of civil appeals] should have rendered. Under this
part of the rule, if, upon reversal of a trial court judgment, a court
of civil appeals should have rendered judgment for the opposite party
but failed to do so, it is the duty of the supreme court to do so. The
second part of the rule contains an exception. By its express provision,
the supreme court is authorized, upon reversal of a trial court judgment, to remand the case to the trial court "if it shall appear that the
justice of the case demands another trial;" or, as the court usually puts
it, "in the interest of justice." Certain aspects of the practice need
discussion.
0 Chief

Justice of the Texas Supreme Court (retired).
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Is remandingin the interest of justice a relatively recent practice?
The answer is "no."
The rule is not new; it had its origin in the practice acts of 18921
and was adopted in 1941 from article 1771, Revised Civil Statutes of
1925. Its wording is virtually identical with its wording in the practice
acts and in article 1771. As a matter of fact, even prior to adoption of
the practice acts the supreme court had remanded "in the interest
of justice" rather than render the judgment that the trial court should
have rendered. In Buzard v. FirstNational Bank,2 the bank sued Buzard
for the amount due on a note, executed only by Pennington, on the
theory that Pennington and Buzard were partners and the note was
given for a partnership debt. The trial court rendered judgment for
the bank. The supreme court held that the evidence did not establish
the partnership and that, therefore, the judgment must be reversed.
The court then noted that the bank's petition did not seek to hold
Buzard liable "on the ground that they were principal and agent,"
and, consequently, the court had "not considered the question of
appellant's [Buzard's] liability by reason of the latter relation." The
court's opinion concludes: "In order that appellee [bank] may take
such further action in the case, by amendment or otherwise, as may be
deemed proper, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause." 3
It will be noted that Buzard was decided before the courts of civil
appeals were created by constitutional amendment in 1891 and before
enactment of the practice acts in 1892. Soon after those events, the
supreme court expressed doubt in a rather clear dictum that it had
jurisdiction to alter a court of civil appeals' judgment which because of
the absence of evidence to support a verdict or judgment either reversed
and rendered or reversed and remanded. In Patrick v. Smith, 4 the trial
court rendered judgment for the plaintiff upon conflicting evidence.
The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for defendant. The supreme court held that where evidence is conflicting a
court of civil appeals may set aside a trial court judgment as being
against the weight and preponderance of the evidence and remand,
but that it may not reverse and render. In the course of the opinion,
the court noticed the statute giving the supreme court power to remand
in the interest of justice, and said:
I Tex. Laws'1892, ch. 14, § 1, at 22, 10 H.
267 Tex. 83, 2 S.W. 54 (1886).

GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs

386 (1898).

3 Id. at 93, 2 S.W. at 59.
490 Tex. 267, 38 S.W. 17 (1896).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol4/iss3/1

2

Calvert: In the Interest of Justice.

IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE

1972]

If there be no evidence to sustain a judgment upon an issue
material to a recovery, the appellate court [Court of Civil Appeals]
may, in its discretion, render judgment for the appellant, or
remand the cause for a new trial. In such a case this court would
probably have no more authority to revise their action than it
would have to reverse a judgment of the District Court, merely
because, in their
opinion, the ends of justice would be promoted
5
by a new trial.

The dictum of Patrick v. Smith did not become, or at least remain,
the rule of decision. Throughout the succeeding 75 years the supreme
court has often exercised its power to remand in the interest of justice
in situations in which a court of civil appeals has reversed and rendered
as well as in cases in which the court of civil appeals has erroneously
affirmed a trial court judgment. The power or propriety of the court's
remanding in the interest of justice in the latter situation is beyond
question; therefore, only cases in which the court has modified a court
of civil appeals' judgment of reversal and rendition will be noticed
in any detail.
First to be considered are cases in which the failure of a court of
civil appeals to remand after reversal has been assigned as error in the
supreme court, or where the record does not disclose whether error was
so assigned.6 These cases span a period of some 50 years. There are
many, many other cases in which similar action has been taken. However, the number of cases in which such action has been taken is of
no real significance; what is of significance is the rule or rules by which
the court has been guided in deciding whether a remand should be
ordered in the interest of justice. On this score, one need not discriminate between those cases in which the supreme court has modified
courts of civil appeals' judgments and those in which the supreme
court has reversed entire judgments of those courts, or even those in
which courts of civil appeals' judgments of rendition have been affirmed.
The rule for deciding whether to remand.
Most of the cases in which the problem has arisen are "no evidence"
cases; that is, cases which are reversed because there is no evidence to
5 Id. at 274, 38 S.W. at 21.
6 See Praetorian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 455 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Sup. 1970); Benoit
v. Wilson, 150 Tex. 273, 239 S.W.2d 792 (1951); Turner v. Texas Co., 138 Tex. 380, 159
S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942, opinion adopted); Colbert v. Joint Stock Land Bank,
129 Tex. 235, 102 S.W.2d 1031 (1937); Smith v. Patton, 241 S.W. 109 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1922, opinion adopted); Waldo v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 50 S.W.2d 274 (rex. Comm'n
App. 1932, holding approved); Associated Oil Co. v. Hart, 277 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1925, jdgmt adopted).
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support the jury's or trial court's finding on a vital fact issue. As early
as 1911, the supreme court laid down the rule to be followed in such
cases in Paris & G.N.R.R. v. Robinson,7 in this language:
[A]s long as there is a probability that a case has for any reason
not been fully developed, this court will not render judgment on
the insufficiency of the evidence. In other words, it must be
apparent to the court that the case has been fully developed, and
that there is no probability that any other evidence can be secured
before it will render judgment.8
Associated Oil Co. v. Hart9 has often been quoted as stating that:
It is the rule, where a judgment has been reversed, to remand to
the trial court rather than to render, where the ends of justice
will be better subserved thereby. Such remanding has often been
ordered to supply additional testimony, to amend the pleadings,
and even to show jurisdiction.
The foregoing rule was quoted and applied in Waldo v. Galveston H. &
S.A. Ry., 10 in which an injured plaintiff pleaded two negligent omissions as a basis for recovery of damages from the railroad. Only the
first was submitted to the jury, and judgment was rendered on the
verdict for the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals reversed the trial
court's judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment on the ground
that the answers to the submitted issues did not constitute a basis for
liability. The commission of appeals reversed and remanded upon a
holding that there was evidence supporting the second theory of
liability and plaintiff was entitled to have it submitted to a jury.
In Turner v. Texas Co.," a remand was ordered so that an injured
plaintiff might seek the testimony of the defendant's automobile driver
since ". . . plaintiff and his counsel may not have been at fault in failing to procure this testimony and . . . they may reasonably have expected that defendants would offer the driver of the automobile as a
witness."' 2 In King v. Hill,1 a remand instead of rendition was ordered
because "[t]he case was tried on a theory different to that made
applicable by the verdict ....-14 In Hall v. O.C. Whitaker Co.,15 a
remand rather than rendition was ordered, the court stating:
104 Tex. 482, 140 S.W. 434 (1911).
8 Id. at 492, 140 S.W. at 439 (emphasis added).
9 277. S.W. 1043, 1045 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, holding approved).
10 50 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved).
11 138 Tex. 380, 159 S.W.2d 112 (1942).
12 Id. at 388, 159 S.W.2d at 117.
18 141 Tex. 294, 172 S.W.2d 298 (1943).
14 Id. at 299, 172 S.W.2d at 301.
15 143 Tex. 397, 185 S.W.2d 720 (1945).
7
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When it does not appear that the facts have been fully developed,
the Supreme Court when reversing the judgment of the Court of
Civil Appeals will remand and not render the case.' 6
Chief Justice Alexander protested in that case that a remand should not
be ordered "merely to see if plaintiff can do better upon another trial."
He added: "At least he should not be given that opportunity in the
absence of reasonable assurance that he can produce other evidence
upon another trial, and the showing of a reasonable excuse for having
7
failed to produce same upon the former trial."'
In United Gas Corp. v. Shepherd Laundries Co.,'" the court said:
From what has been said it follows that the respondent has
failed to allege or prove a cause of action either for overcharge or
discrimination. However, since the cause has been tried upon an
erroneous theory we think justice will best be subserved by remanding the cause rather than rendering judgment for petitioner.
In Morrison v. Farmer,19 remand was ordered to permit a plaintiff who
was losing a suit for title to property to sue for the value of improvements placed on the lot. In remanding Benoit v. Wilson, the court
stated that "[r]endition of judgment, where a case has been tried upon
the wrong theory, should only occur where the record discloses that
the complaining party would not have been able to recover had the
case been tried on the right theory. ' 20 In Hicks v. Matthews, 21 the
plaintiff had two theories of recovery and went to the jury on only one
of them. The court held that the judgment could not stand on the
submitted theory, but remanded for trial on the other theory, saying:
This court exercises a wide discretion in determining whether
it should render final judgment here or remand the case for another trial. The fact that a peremptory instruction would have
been justified does not necessarily
mean that the cause should not
22
be remanded to the trial court.

In City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking, Inc.,23 respondent presented no evidence that an ordinance was arbitrary or unreasonable as
to it because it did not think it had that burden. The court remanded
instead of rendering because respondent "proceeded under a mistake of
16 1d. at 405, 185 S.W.2d at 724

17 Id. at 406, 185 S.W.2d at 724 (dissenting opinion).
18 144 Tex. 164, 179, 189 S.W.2d 485, 492 (1945).
19 147 Tex. 122, 213 S.W.2d 813 (1948).
20 150 Tex. 273, 284, 239 S.W.2d 792, 799 (1951) (emphasis added).
21 155 Tex. 177, 266 S.W.2d 846 (1954).
22 Id. at 183, 266 S.W.2d at 849 (emphasis added).
23 158 Tex. 318, 311 S.W.2d 218 (1958).
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law in presenting his case," 24 and a remand was in the interest of
"fairness and justice." In Davis v. Gale, a remand was ordered with the
declaration that "it is the rule to remand to the trial court for a new
trial rather than to render, where the ends of justice will be better
subserved thereby." 25 In American Title Insurance Co. v. Byrd,2 6 the
court let an experienced attorney go back for another "bite at the
apple" after holding that he had no right of action under article 4004
against a title guaranty company, but that he might have a right of
action on another theory. In C. & R. Transport, Inc. v. Campbell,27
a case was remanded in the interest of justice because it appeared that
the jury may have misunderstood the court's charge. In Houston Fire
& Casualty Insurance Co. v. Nichols,28 the court remanded because
"[t]o deny Nichols another opportunity to develop his evidence fully
would be unjust."
The foregoing cases should illustrate that the rule is to remand
wherever and whenever it appears that a party with a meritorious
claim or defense will lose his case without another opportunity to
present it in the trial court. There are a few cases in which the supreme
court has refused to remand, and, indeed, some in which it has reversed
a court of civil appeals' judgment of remand, but those cases are the
exception rather than the rule, and judgment has usually been rendered
only after a searching examination of the record.29
Cases in which the trial court has rendered judgment non obstante
veredicto fall into a special category. In this category are LeMaster v.
Fort Worth Transit Co.,80 Scott v. Liebman,8 1 and Jackson v. Ewton.8 2
In these cases the rule is that, following reversal, judgment should be
rendered on the verdict unless good and sufficient reason for remanding is "reflected by the record." 3 But even here, remand rather than
rendition can be ordered.8 4
24 Id. at 327, 311 S.W.2d at 223 (emphasis added).
25 160 Tex. 309, 313, 330 S.W.2d 610, 613 (1960) (emphasis added).
26 384 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
27 406 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
28 435 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
29 See City of Fort Worth v. Pippen, 439 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Sup. 1969); Missouri Pac. R.R.
v. Whittenburg & Alston, 424 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Sup. 1968); London Terrace, Inc. v. McAlister, 142 Tex. 608, 180 S.W.2d 619 (1944); Great At. g&Pac. Tea Co. v. Evans, 142 Tex.
1, 175 S.W.2d 249 (1943); Yarbrough v. Booher, 141 Tex. 420, 174 S.W.2d 47 (1943); McMahan v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 138 Tex. 626, 161 S.W.2d 70 (1942); Great Plains Oil & Gas
Co. v. Foundation Oil Co., 137 Tex. 324, 153 S.W.2d 452 (1941).
80 138 Tex. 512, 160 S.W.2d 224 (1942).
31 404 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
32411 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
8 Id. at 718.
84 Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
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Is a remand in the interest of justice authorized to
correct injustice resultingfrom trial tactics?
The answer is "yes.'"
The first problem in answering this question is in recognizing when
an unjust judgment may result from trial tactics and when it may
result from the negligence of counsel or the trial judge. Look, for
example, at many of the cases previously analyzed.
In Buzard, was the bank's reliance on partnership and its failure to
plead and prove a case of principal and agent trial tactics or negligence? In Waldo, was submission of only one of the plaintiff's two
negligence theories the result of trial tactics, or counsel negligence, or
the trial court's ruling? In Turner, was the failure of plaintiff's counsel
to call the defendant's driver as a witness or take his deposition trial
tactics or counsel negligence? And, how about King v. Hill? In Morrison, was it trial tactics that plaintiff sought to recover title to the
house and lot rather than the value of the improvements? In Hicks,
was it trial tactics, or negligence, or the trial court's mistake that
prompted plaintiff's counsel to go to the jury on the one of his two
theories of liability on which he could not recover? In Byrd, was it
trial tactics that prompted Byrd to sue under article 400481 which, if
applicable, would have given him a much greater award of damages
than a mere breach of contract action?
Even if the court always has the ken to know when a case has been
lost by trial tactics rather than negligence or ignorance, it would not
be just to adopt a rule of rendering judgment instead of remanding in
the interest of justice merely because a litigant's lawyer made the
wrong chess move.
Has the supreme court, upon agreeingwith a court of civil appeals'
judgment of reversal, modified the court of civil appeals'
judgment of renditionand ordered a remand instead
without a point of errorseeking such action?
The answer is "yes."
In support of a "yes" answer, see Dahlberg v. Holden,86 Kennedy v.
American National insurance Co.,37 Taylor v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 8 Maupin v. Chaney,39 Southampton Civic Club v.
85 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4004 (1966).
38 150 Tex. 179, 238 S.W.2d 699 (1951).
37 130 Tex. 155, 107 S.W.2d 364 (1937).
38 283 S.W. 161 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, holding approved).
89 139 Tex. 426, 163 S.W.2d 380 (1942).
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Couch, 40 and Scott v. Liebman.41 There may well be other cases in
which the court has followed the practice but they are not easily found
by simply reading opinions.
Two of the cited cases need explanation, but Kennedy, Taylor,
Maupin, and Couch do not; these four are cases, pure and simple, in
which a court of civil appeals reversed and rendered, and the supreme
court, without a point of error seeking such action, ordered a remand
instead of rendition.
Now to Dahlberg v. Holden. The record in the case shows conclusively that defendant was given a second bite at the apple to remedy
counsel's misfired trial tactics. The facts in the case are too complicated
to go into them in detail. Suit was in trespass to try title. The trial
court awarded plaintiffs full title as against defendant, Dahlberg, who
claimed only a mineral interest, but ordered that they take nothing as
against defendant, Paul, who had purchased the surface from Dahlberg.42 The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment and awarded
plaintiffs full title as against both defendants. 4 Neither of the defendants had a point of error before the supreme court complaining that
the court of civil appeals erred in failing to remand in the interest
of justice. The supreme court affirmed. 44 On rehearing, Dahlberg
asserted, alternatively, for the first time, that in any event the court
Should remand in the interest of justice to permit him to make proof of
itle to a two-thirds interest. In this connection, he said in his motion
for rehearing:
[A]lthough the record does not reflect it, the Petitioner Dahlberg
states to the court that there is a chain of conveyances into him and
the Petitioner Paul with respect to the remaining two-thirds interest, which conveyances were not offered in evidence in the trial
court.
In spite of this open admission that his proof had been deficient because of trial tactics, the court heard Dahlberg's cry for justice, set
45
aside its earlier judgment as to the two-thirds interest, and remanded.
In Southampton Civic Club v. Couch,46 the court set aside its first
judgment and reversed and remanded on rehearing without anyone
40 159 Tex. 464, 322 S.W.2d 516 (1959).
41 404 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
42 Dahlberg v. Holden, 150 Tex. 179, 182, 238 S.W.2d 699, 700 (1951).
48 Id. at 183, 238 S.W.2d at 701.
44 Id. at 186, 238 S.W.2d at 703.
45 Id. at 187, 238 S.W.2d at 704.
46 159 Tex. 464, 322 S.W.2d 516 (1959).
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asking that it do so by point of error in either the original applications
or the motion for rehearing.
In Scott v. Liebman,47 the court remanded in the interest of justice
after reversing the court of civil appeals' judgment, without a point
of error invoking the power given by Rule 505.48 Petitioner did have
points of error complaining of the fact that the court of civil appeals'
judgment of rendition against him had the effect of denying him a
jury trial and thus was lacking in fundamental fairness.4 9 However,
that the court thought it was remanding in the interest of justice without a point of error so requesting seems evident from citation of
Dahlberg and Southampton Civic Club and its summary of the Dahlberg holding, as follows:
However, both the Court of Civil Appeals and this Court,
having found error in the judgment of the trial court, are authorized in a proper case to remand in the interest of justice.
Both courts have discretion in this matter. Rule 505 specifically
authorizes this Court to do so. 50
Should the supreme court as a policy matter retain and exercise the
right to pursue the course of action of remandingin
the interest of justice?
The answer is "yes."
The supreme *court is constantly striving and straining, and bending
rules of procedure, to try to achieve a result deemed by it to be just and
equitable. Now, here is the one and only rule which expressly confers
the power upon the court to render a judgment purely for the purpose
of achieving justice, and it would seem that the court had better keep
its hand firmly on the tiller lest one day it have before it a case in
which a court of civil appeals has entered a terribly unjust judgment
of rendition and the petitioner has failed to present a point of error
complaining of the court's failure to remand in the interest of justice.
Some may think that to adopt the practice suggested violates the rule
against reversing on a ground not assigned as error in a point of error,
and that it will lead eventually to reversals in all situations without a
point of error. Experience does not so indicate. In the first place, the
practice has already been adopted, as shown by the cases cited above,
and it has not led to wholesale reversals. Moreover, the practice does
404 S.W.2d 288 (rex. Sup. 1966).
TEx. R. Civ. P. 505.
Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288, 294 (rex. Sup. 1966)
50 Id. at 294 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

47
48
49
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not violate the rule against reversal on a ground not assigned in a
point of error. As pointed out in Scott v. Liebman5 l and Dahlberg v.
Holden,52 Rule 505 and courts of civil appeals' Rule 434 confer coequal
and independent powers of discretion upon the supreme court and
courts of civil appeals, with no suggestion in Rule 505 that the supreme
court's discretion can be exercised only if invoked by point of error.
The courts do not require as a predicate for court of civil appeals'
action that exercise of its discretion to remand be invoked by request
of the appellee, and there would seem to be no more reason for
requiring a point of error to invoke supreme court discretion. Finally,
by the express wording of Rule 505, the injunction laid upon the
supreme court to remand is mandatory if the court concludes that
"the justice of the case demands another trial."
CONCLUSION

While the foregoing is primarily intended to demonstrate, through
both history and precedent, that there is one area in appealed cases
in which the supreme court has almost unbridled discretion of action
in its yearning to achieve justice in particular cases, it should also point
up certain procedural courses of action which a careful appellate lawyer
should not overlook. An appellee in a court of civil appeals which is
being urged to reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment
for the appellant, should always urge, alternatively, that a remand be
ordered in the interest of justice under Rule 434, Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, if reversal occurs. Although the wording of Rule 434
differs from that of Rule 505, they have substantially the same meaning.53 If a court of civil appeals fails to hear the plea and renders
judgment for the appellant, the appellee, as petitioner in the supreme
court, should assert error on the part of the court of civil appeals in
failing to remand. That this course of action is not absolutely essential
to a judgment of remand "in the interest of justice" is clearly held by
the supreme court in the very recent case of Morrow v. Shotwell,54 but
why risk the chance that the appellate courts may fail to see and
appreciate that the justice of the case requires a remand?
One further admonition is justified. Attorneys frequently interpret
Rule 505 and the cases cited herein as authorizing the supreme court
at 294.
Dahlberg v. Holden, 150 Tex. 179, 187, 238 S.W.2d 699, 704 (1951).
See London Terrace, Inc. v. McAlister, 142 Tex. 608, 180 S.W.2d 619 (1944).
477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Sup. 1972).

51 Id.
52
53
54
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to reverse trial court judgments in the interest of justice. Not so.
Neither Rule 505 nor Rule 434 authorizes reversal of an errorless
judgment. 55 The rules merely authorize remand for retrial rather than
rendition of judgment once the appellate court has held that the trial
court's judgment must be reversed because it is erroneous.
55 City of Houston v. Blackbird, 394 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Sup. 1965); Davis v. Davis, 141
Tex. 613, 175 S.W.2d 226 (1943); National Life Co. v. McKelvey, 131 Tex. 81, 113 S.W.2d
160 (1938).
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